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INTRODUCTION 
Collective licensing occurs where a single agent is empowered to license 
uses on behalf of many individual copyright holders. Agents can be 
empowered voluntarily, with copyright holders opting in to permit licensing 
of their works, or they can be established or empowered by statute. 
Collective licensing has been suggested as a possible solution for the 
obstacle copyright law places in the path of new uses of works enabled by 
innovative technologies.2 Collective licensing does have the potential to 
reduce transaction costs when a large number of works are licensed to a 
large number of users, thereby benefiting both rightsholders and users. 
However, the track record of collective organizations (CROs),3 the entities 
that manage collective licenses, reveals that they often fail to live up to that 
potential. Although there are a wide variety of CROs operating under 
divergent legal frameworks, many unfortunately share the characteristic of 
serving their own interests at the expense of artists and the public. 
CROs are well-funded and well-organized, and have succeeded in 
promoting themselves and the collective licensing model.4 The objective of 
this article is to tell the other side of the story to provide balance to any 
policy discussion that addresses collective licensing and CROs. Even 
experts who tout the benefits of collective licensing in the abstract often 
include the caveat that in practice these bodies require a "well-developed 
2. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 17 (2011 ), available at http://www.cop 
yright.gov/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October20ll.pdf ("It is possible 
that direct licensing, collective licensing, and other emerging business models will be 
capable of balancing the needs of user groups and the interests of copyright owners."); 
Pamela Samuelson, Legislative Alternatives to the Coogle Book Settlement, 34 COLUM. J. L. 
&ARTS 697,705 (2011) 
If Congress wanted to authorize the creation of an [institutional 
subscription database] of in-copyright, out-of-print books, such as 
that contemplated in the [Google Book Search] settlement, without 
the necessity of clearing rights on a book by book basis, one option 
would be to adopt an extended collective licensing (ECL) regime 
akin to those authorized in several Nordic countries; 
David R. Hansen, Orphan Works: Mapping the Possible Solution Spaces 17 (Berkeley 
Digital Library Copyright Project, White Paper No.2, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=201 
9121 ("[S]ome suggest that ECL regimes can be adapted to specifically allow for the mass 
digitization initiatives that are required to bring about large online digital libraries"). 
3. CROs are also referred to as copyright management organizations or collecting 
societies. 
4. See, e.g., the many interventions of the International Federation of Reproduction 
Rights Organizations in national and international policymaking processes. Position Papers, 
IFRRO.ORG, http://www.ifrro.org/content/position-papers (last visited July 12, 2013). 
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structure and culture of collective management."5 The episodes recounted 
below reveal a long history of corruption, mismanagement, confiscation of 
funds, and lack of transparency that has deprived artists of the revenues they 
earned. At the same time, CROs have often aggressively sought fees to 
which they were not legally entitled or in a manner that discredited the 
copyright system. While properly regulated CROs in some circumstances 
may enhance efficiency and advance the interests of rightsholders and users, 
policymakers must be aware of CROs' mixed history as they consider the 
appropriateness of CROs as a possible solution to a specific copyright issue. 
In discussions of copyright policy, lawmakers generally consider two 
broad stakeholder groups: authors on the one hand and the general public on 
the other.6 This paper will examine how CROs have done significant harm 
to each of the groups they are supposed to help.7 
I. HOW CROS HARM AUTHORS 
While CROs hold rights in the sense that they are empowered by 
rightsholders to permit certain uses of covered works, they are not the 
rightsholders whose creative endeavors copyright is meant to motivate. 
Copyright is meant to motivate authors (conceived broadly to include all 
creators of original works-writers, artists, musicians, and so on) to create 
and publish their work. Intermediaries can also serve that purpose by 
helping authors to make their works available to the public, but to the extent 
5. Johan Axhamn & Lucie Guibault, Cross-border extended collective licensing: a 
solution to online dissemination of Europe's cultural heritage? viii (lnstituut Voor 
Informatierecht, 201 1), http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/guibault/ECL_Europeana_final_report 
0920II.pdf. See also id. at 41 ("[ECL] presupposes the existence of a representative CMO 
with a sound culture of good governance and transparency."); Samuelson, supra note 2, at 24 
(noting that the unfamiliarity of ECLs may be a barrier to their adoption in the U.S.); Tarja 
Koskinen-Olsson, Collective Management in Nordic Countries, in COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 283, 306 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2010) 
("[The system of ECLs in Nordic countries] presupposes in other words that the 'copyright 
market' is well organized and disciplined."). Experts have suggested that the United States 
has a copyright culture that would be less favorable to a broader role for CROs. See, e.g., 
Daniel Gervais, Keynote: The Landscape of Collective Management Schemes, 34 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 591, 593-94 (2011) (explaining that "the fundamentally economic model under 
which [CROs] operate in the United States, and the worldview that informs it, are likely to 
limit" the role that CROs play in the copyright ecosystem in the U.S.). 
6. The U.S. Constitution clearly designates the public as the primary stakeholder 
where copyright is concerned, with rightsholders benefiting only insofar as their limited 
rights ensure "progress" for the public. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ('The Congress shall 
have the Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries .... "). See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 
349 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"'). 
7. The various anecdotes contained in this paper are based on published reports. 
We have not independently verified the accuracy of any of these reports. 
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that intermediaries like CROs treat authors unfairly, they demoralize 
authors and undermine copyright's constitutional purpose. There are several 
ways a CRO can harm an author, but the most commonly reported harms 
are corruption, mismanagement, lack of transparency and choice, 
mistreatment of songwriters, mistreatment of performers, and slow 
adaptation to new technology. The anecdotes collected below show that 
CROs can do significant harm to the authors that copyright is supposed to 
benefit. 
A. Corruption 
No human institution is perfect, but as Professor Ariel Katz explains in 
connection with Canadian collecting societies, CROs have unique 
incentives for corruption and mismanagement. CROs are subject to 
systemic problems that have been well-documented in the literature of 
corporate governance, and are not subject to mechanisms that check 
misbehavior by corporate managers-a recipe for disaster: 
If copyright owners are indeed numerous and dispersed, then we may 
assume that Canadian collectives will exhibit the classic problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control. Collective action 
problems would prevent the individual members from exercising their 
right of control to the benefit of insiders (either members with greater 
representation or influence or managers). While such problems associated 
with dispersed ownership are pervasive in the corporate world (and have 
generated a voluminous corporate governance literature), the Canadian 
collectives' situation is quite unique among Canadian corporations 
because not only do they not face market discipline, they also do not have 
to respond to other disciplinary threats: the threat of exit by their members, 
or the threat of takeover. Under such conditions, productive inefficiency 
seems almost inevitable.8 
I. Brazil 
In April 2012, fifteen officials of Escrit6rio Central de Arrecada<;ao e 
Distribui<;ao(ECAD), the Brazilian CRO responsible for the collection of 
licensing fees for music, faced indictment after a Senate investigation of 
charges of embezzlement, fraud, and price-fixing.9 The Senate panel 
8. Ariel Katz, Commentary: Is Collective Administration of Copyrights Justified by 
the Economic Literature? in COMPETITION POLICY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 449, 463-64 
(Marcel Boyer et al. eds., 2007). 
9. Attilio Gorini, Brazilian collection society under scrutiny, ENT. L. BRAZ. (May 2, 
2012, 9:00 AM), http://entertainmentlawbrazil.corn.br/20 12/05/02/brazilian-collection-societ 
y-under-scrutiny/; Timothy Lee, Not just the pirates: Brazilian rights holders indicted for 
ripping off artists, ARSTECHNICA (May I, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy 
/20 12/05/copyright -cops-behaving-bad] y/. 
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described ECAD's collection system as a "black box," where only 76 
percent of the fees collected were paid to artists. The ECAD directors paid 
themselves large bonuses even though the CRO was losing money. In 
response, amendments to the copyright law to increase government 
oversight are under discussion. 
2. Spain 
In 2011, government raids on Spanish music CRO Sociedad General de 
Autores y Editores (SGAE) uncovered the embezzlement of close to $550 
million.10 This money was meant to go to artists whose the organization was 
managing. The theft allegedly was perpetrated by leaders of the 
organization, including president Teddy Bautista. Bautista has since stepped 
down from his position and other members of the organization are still 
under investigation. 
3. Italy 
The Italian government investigated its mandatory CRO, Istituto 
Mutualistico Artistico Interpreti Esecutori (IMAIE), in 2009. The 
investigation was based on allegations of the funneling of $24-30 million 
into nonexistent projects. 11 
4. Sweden 
In 2007, Hans Lindstrom, the chief executive of Swedish music 
performance CRO Swedish Artists and Musicians Interet Group (SAMI), 
was removed from office because of charges of corruption. 12 Lindstrom 
subsequently became the object of a large-scale criminal investigation 
regarding the misuse of SAMI funds. After Lindstrom's removal, a new 
chief executive was appointed in secret without consultation of the CRO's 
members. 
10. Detuvieron a los beneficiarios del "canon digital" espanol, PERAL.COM (Jan. 7, 
20 II, 3:25 PM) (Arg.), http://www.perfil.corn.ar/contenidos/20 II/07/0I/noticia_0024.html; 
Enigmax, Music Rights Groups Raided By Police, Bosses Arrested For Fraud, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jul. 3, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/music-rights-group-raided-by-police-b 
osse's-arrested-for-fraud-1 10702/. 
II. Mark Worden, The Royal Scam? Italian Fraud Investigation Targets Members of 
Collection Society /MAlE, BILLBOARD, Nov. 29,2008, at 14. 
12. Per Gulbrandsen, Detta iir SAMI-hiirvan, SVERIGESRADIO (Oct. 18, 2007) 
(Swed.), http://sverigesradio.selsidalartikel.aspx?programid= I 012&artikel= 166491. 
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5. Ghana 
Musicians in Ghana "have claimed that officials of the Copyright Society 
of Ghana and the government copyright officials have corruptly diverted the 
royalties they do collect."13 
6. Nigeria 
Mayo Ayilaran, CEO of Nigerian CRO Musical Copyright Society 
Nigeria (MCSN), was arraigned along with several top executives of MCSN 
in December 2012 on charges of collecting illegal copyright royalties and 
running an unapproved collecting society. The charges were brought m 
response to allegations of harassment from three major hotels in Lagos. 14 
B. Mismanagement, Excessive Overhead, and Unfair Distribution 
While there have been instances of outright corruption and illegality at 
CROs, the more common complaint from artists is that CROs violate 
standards of fairness and efficiency. The stories below show CROs 
extracting profits at the expense of artists, operating bloated bureaucracies, 
wasting collective resources, and favoring superstars at the expense of 
ordinary working artists. 
The stories below highlight individual instances, but there are some 
general problems that seemingly plague CROs wherever they operate. For 
example, CROs often create substantial lag times between a licensee paying 
and an artist receiving his money. This is especially true in international 
markets, where royalties are customarily paid to a publisher's local 
representative in a given country. Months can pass as the royalty earnings 
migrate from these international, to regional, and finally home offices of 
CROs. 15 In some cases, money never reaches artists. For example, 
according to TuneCore CEO, Jeff Price, foreign CROs often collect license 
fees for digital music downloads of songs written by American songwriters 
that the CROs do not represent. 16 The CROs might distribute some of these 
fees to local affiliates of record labels or to American CROs such as 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), 
13. Mark Schultz & Alec Van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping Poor 
Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 KY. L.J. 79, 131 (2009). 
14. MCSN's Mayo Ayilaran and 6 Other Officials Arraigned for Illegal Collection of 
Royalties, COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF NIGERIA, http://www.cosonng.com/?p=604 (last visited 
Apr. I, 2013). 
15. Glenn Peoples, Accounts Viewable: Music Publishing Moves Toward Greater 
Transparency and Accountability, BILLBOARD, Jan. 28, 2012, at 21. 
16. Jeff Price, How Major Music Companies are Getting Your Royalties: The Global 
Songwriter Shell Game, HYPEBOT (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/20 12/ 
03/the-global-songwriter-shell-game-why-the-major-music-companies-are-getting-your-
royalties.htmk. 
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Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMD, or Society of European Stage Authors and 
Composers (SESAC), but little of the money ever reaches the copyright 
owner. Another licensing industry study claims that music CROs engage in 
"retitling"-registering the same song under alternate titles-in order to "to 
control and earn a significant share of the royalties collected."17 
1. Canada 
Access Copyright is the powerful CRO that administers reproduction 
rights for print books in Canada. In 2011, Professor Michael Geist 
attempted to untangle Access Copyright's notoriously obfuscated 
financials. 18 In 2011 its revenue was $33.7 million, of which $8.7 million 
directly went to administrative costs, largely salary for lawyers and 
administrators. Beyond this, Access Copyright spends $6.7 million 
compensating foreign CROs, $10 million is deferred due to ongoing legal 
battles (much of which would go to rights holders if court cases go Access 
Copyright's way), and $491,000 is paid towards the Access Copyright 
Foundation, which collects fees for copyright owners who cannot be 
located. 
After that, $7.8 million is left to distribute to rights holders. The split 
here is estimated to be a 60/40 split in favor of publishers. In the end, only 
$3.1 million, less than 10% of its revenue, goes to the authors of creative 
work. Geist estimates that the average distribution to authors based on this 
licensing was $319. 
Another Canadian copyright attorney, Howard Knopf, examined Access 
Copyright's financial reports in 2008 and discovered that a surprising $2.5 
million had been spent on legal fees for Copyright Board filings in 2006-
2007.19 
Many Canadian artists have alleged unfairness in the way Access 
Copyright distributes funds to publishers and authors. The League of 
Canadian Poets complained in 2008 that "only a handful of large publishers 
are receiving significant benefits," and that "writers and the small presses 
that publish most Canadian culture receive virtually nothing from the 
system."20 The League asked the Minister of Canadian Heritage to conduct a 
full audit of Access Copyright. In 2011, the Writers Union of Canada also 
17. Press Release, Music Licensing Directory, Music Industry Plagued by Retitling 
of Songs (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.musiclicensingdirectory.com!blogs/mld-
blog/press-releas-music-industry-plagued-by-retitling-of-songs/#sthash.BQB8AIUM.dpuf. 
18. Michael Geist, The Economics Behind Access Copyright, MICHAELGEIST (May 
26, 20 II), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5819/l 25/. 
19. Howard Knopf, Auditing Access Copyright?, EXCESS COPYRIGHT (Oct. 16, 2008, 
4:42PM), http:l/excesscopyright.blogspot.ca/2008/10/audting-access-copyright.html. 
20. Howard Knopf, Creators v. Access Copyright, ExcESs CoPYRIGHT (Oct. 15, 
2008, 2:26 PM), http://excesscopyright. blogspot.com/2008/1 0/creators-v-access-copyrigh 
t.html. 
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called for investigation and reform in Access Copyright. Among their 
concerns was the following: "key differences in the copyright interests of 
publishers and creators will always prevent Access Copyright from fully 
and effectively representing creators' copyright interests."21 
Canadian writer Brian Brett, former chair of the Writers' Union, issued a 
scathing critique of Access Copyright in 2012. Among Brett's criticisms 
were that Access Copyright refuses to distribute to authors income from 
works older than twenty years, yet it continues to collect that income in 
their name. Brett also alleged that Access Copyright continues to pay 
publishers the income for works whose rights have reverted totally to the 
authors.22 
2. United States 
By 2007, U.S. digital performance rights CRO SoundExchange had 
accumulated over $100 million in undistributed compulsory license fees. 
SoundExchange took the position that it could retain unclaimed fees, even 
from well-known artists that it asserted it could not find. In 2012, 
SoundExchange announced that any fees unclaimed for more than three 
years could be distributed to performers who had registered with 
SoundExchange. 23 
In 2011, SoundExchange admitted in a filing with the Copyright Office 
that more than 10% of the recordings played by its statutory licensees 
consist of recordings made prior to 1972, which are not covered by federal 
copyright and so are not covered by federal statutory licenses.24 
According to its annual financial reports from December 2011, 
SoundExchange was carrying a $363 million balance of money that had not 
yet passed through to artists and other rightsholders. According to a 
Billboard analysis, the balance is a "collection of moneys in transit, in 
21. Michael Geist, The Access Copyright Backlash: Writers Union of Canada Calls 
for Collective Licensing Reform, MICHAELGEIST (May 29, 2011), http://www.michaelgeist 
.ca/content/view/5821 1125/. 
22. Brian Brett, An Open Letter on Access Copyright and the Canadian Copyright 
Emergency, STRAIGHT.COM (June 26, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.straight.com/news/open-
letter-access-copyright-and-canadian-copyright-emergency. 
23. Cory Doctorow, Ex-RIAA Agency "Can't Find" Artists It Owes Money to, Like 
Public Enemy, BOINGBOING (Sept. 21,2006,4:59 PM), http:/lboingboing.net/2006/09/211 
exriaa-agency-cant-f.html; Fred Wilhelms, $101 Million 'Stuck to SoundExchange's 
Fingers,' P2PNET (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.p2pnet.net/story/18864; Unregistered Artists, 
SouNoExcHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/performer-owner/does-sex-have-money-
for-you/unregistered-artists/ (last visited July 12, 2013). 
24. Steven R. Englund, SoundExchange, Inc., Comments of SoundExchange, Inc. 
Before the U.S. Copyright Office In The Matter Of' Federal Copyright Protection of Sound 
Recordings Fixed Before February 15, 1972 5 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.copyr 
ight.gov/docs/sound/comments/initial/20 110 131-Steven-R-Englund-Sound-Exchange.pdf. 
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limbo and in doubt."25 While the money that is "in transit" will be paid to 
artists in the near future, a significant amount is in the "in limbo or in 
doubt" category. According to Billboard, "After all the organization's 
efforts to find and sign up artists and sound recording owners, and after all 
the media attention given to Pandora and SoundExchange, tens of millions 
of dollars still sits waiting to be paid."26 
The Copyright Clearance Center, a U.S. CRO for publishers, used the 
copyright license fees it collected to underwrite half the expense of 
litigation brought by three publishers against Georgia State University 
(GSU) for its electronic reserves system. After several years of litigation, 
the publishers were able to prove only five infringements out of 99 
allegedly infringing works. The court subsequently found that GSU was the 
"prevailing party," and ordered the plaintiffs to pay GSU's attorneys' fees 
and costs, which totaled over $2.8 million. Funders of the lawsuit stated 
publicly that they had spent millions of dollars for their own legal fees; in 
the end the court found only $750 in lost licensing revenue across three 
representative semesters. The misguided litigation was thus an enormous 
waste of resources, supposedly on behalf of rightsholders. 
Several photographers sued the Copyright Clearance Center in 2006 for 
copyright infringement and false advertising because the CRO implied that 
its licenses for books gave a "green light" for licensees to reproduce 
photographs contained in the books, without regard for the rights of 
photographers whose works are not covered by CCC licenses. Although the 
CCC prevailed on technical grounds, the case demonstrates a CRO 
overstating its authority and ignoring interests of other rights holders.27 
3. Bahamas 
According to the Bahama Tribune, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal has 
collected license fees for eleven years but has never made any payments to 
copyright owners.28 The U.S. Trade Representative has complained to the 
Bahamian government about Copyright Royalty Tribunals' failure to 
distribute funds. 29 
25. Glenn Peoples, Exclusive-SoundExchange Financials: How Much Paid vs. How 
Much in Limbo?, BILLBOARD (Dec. 24, 2012,4:03 PM), http://www.billboard.bizlbbbiz/ind 
ustry/legal-and-managementlexclusive-soundexchange-financials-how-much-1 008061022. 
story#3Dap4xsDi6Utmw8W.99. 
26. /d. 
27. Resnick v. Copyright Clearance Ctr., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Mass. 2006). 
28. Michael Geist, Copyright Holders Receive 'Not One Cent' In II Years, 
MICHAELGEIST (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/contentlview/6223/. 
29. Candia Dames, Copyright Blacklist Threat, DENNIS DAMES ONLINE, DENNIS 
DAMES ONLINE (Apr. 3, 2004), http://dennisdamesonline.net/Copyright.html. 
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4. Colombia 
The Colombian National Directorate of Copyrights under the Ministry of 
the Interior provisionally suspended the governing board of the Society of 
Authors and Composers of Colombia (Sayco ), after the resignation of the 
Sayco chief executive because of allegations of mismanagement and two 
days of protests by music composers.30 The Directorate noted that Sayco 
does not have transparent rules to ensure the fair distribution of the funds it 
collects. The Directorate also hinted that there was evidence of corruption 
and excessive spending on entertainment and the remodeling of Sayco's 
headquarters. 
5. Brazil 
The Brazilian Senate investigation of ECAD in the wake of the 
corruption scandal described above revealed that ECAD had a policy of 
"retaining" royalties whenever it had difficulty identifying rightsholders.31 
In 2004, ECAD used approximately $500,000 in retained royalties to cover 
operating deficits-an unauthorized use of rightsholder funds. (After a five-
year waiting period, the royalties should have been distributed to the other 
rights holders represented by ECAD). 
6. United Kingdom 
The band U2, which has consistently been among the most successful 
performing artists of the last 30 years, brought legal action in 1994 against 
the UK CRO Performing Right Society (PRS), saying PRS and its 
continental partners were highly inefficient in collecting performance rights, 
and seeking to administer its own rights going forward. The group dropped 
its complaint in 1998 in exchange for an undisclosed payment from PRS 
and assurances of increased efficiency. At the commencement of the 
dispute, European CROs were taking 30-40% of royalties as fees and taking 
up to a year to distribute funds. 32 
30. Gobierno suspende provisionalmente a/ Consejo Directivo de Sayco, LA 
REPUBLICA, (Aug. I 0, 2012), http://www.larepublica.co/asuntos-legales/gobierno-suspende-
provisionalmente-al-consejo-directi vo-de-sayco_l7887. 
31. Comissao Parlamentar de lnquerito, Relat6rio Final: Comissiio Parlamentar de 
lnquerito destinada a investigar supostas irregularidades praticadas pelo Escrit6rio Central 
de Arrecadat;iio e Distribuit;iio-ECAD (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.senado.gov.br/ 
atividade/materia/getPDF.asp?t= I 06951 &tp= I [hereinafter Comissiio Parlamentar de 
lnquerito]. 
32. Jeff Clark-Meads, U2 Settles Royalty Suit with U.K.'s PRS, BILLBOARD, Apr. 18, 
1998, at 4 available at http://books.google.com/books?id=mQ4EAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA8-IA 
2#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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7. Extended Collective Licensing in the Nordic Countries 
"Extended collective licensing" (ECL) is a device whereby a CRO that 
obtains permission from a portion of a category of rightsholders is deemed 
by law to have authority to grant licenses on behalf of all rightsholders in 
the category. ECL regimes are common in the Nordic countries, and have 
been proposed as solutions to many of the problems presented by copyright 
in the age of new technological uses.33 As one scholarly examination of 
ECLs points out, however, foreign rightsholders who seek fair remuneration 
from domestic CROs are "confronted with severe practical obstacles .... "34 It 
is difficult for foreign rightsholders to know that their works are being used, 
especially in the case of orphan -works. CROs often use some of their 
proceeds to fund collective projects to benefit their members, but those 
benefits generally do not accrue to foreign rightsholders. Foreigners are 
more likely than domestic rightsholders to have their income repurposed in 
this way, as they are more likely to have marginal amounts of income, to 
have their work deemed "orphans," or otherwise to be excluded from 
ordinary distribution. Foreigners may also be excluded from remuneration if 
they are not members of a CRO in their own country that is partnered with 
the domestic CRO administering the ECL. 
8. Romania 
In Romania, the government office responsible for supervtsmg the 
functioning of CROs is the Office for Author Rights (ORDA). Since 2010, 
the activities of three CROs have been suspended for various periods of 
time due to mismanagement, lack of transparency, and abuses. These 
measures were taken after complaints from rightsholders, mostly 
independent writers, performers or other types of artists. 
COPYPRO, a CRO that manages rights in literary works, lost its 
operating permit in 2011 because the fees for managing the collection and 
distribution of rights were not in accordance with legal provisions.35 
COPYPRO retained 60% of the collected amounts, while ORDA allows a 
maximum fee of 15%. COPYPRO's operating permit was reinstated after 
changes in the CRO statute, but rightsholders continue to express concerns 
with its activities.36 
33. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 2. 
34. See Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
Experience-It's a Hybrid but is it a VOLVO or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L & ARTS 471 
(2010). 
35. Robert Bucur, ORDA Director General, ORDA Notice for Compliance (Sept 27, 
20 II), available at http://www.orda.ro/fisiereffoate%200GC%20date%20control%20pt% 
202010/COPYRO/Decizia%20260%20COPYR0%20intrare%20in%201egalitate.pdf. 
36. ORDA Findings, Proces-verbal privind activitatea Societatii de Gestiune 
Colectiva a Drepturilor de Autor CopyRo in anul2010 (Sept 9, 2011), available at http://w 
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At the beginning of 2012, ORDA suspended Centrul Roman pentru 
Administrarea Drepturilor Arti~tilor Interpreti (CREDIDAM), a CRO that 
manages rights for performing artists, for not respecting the legal 
requirement that it start negotiations concerning the distribution of collected 
license fees.37 Artists had identified irregularities in the way the amounts 
were distributed. Currently, the CRO's activities have resumed on the basis 
of a court order, but the main issues are still under debate. 
CREDIDAM was also investigated by the European Commission's 
Competition Unit due to a complaint by the UK-based Right Agency that 
CREDIDAM and EJI (a Hungarian CRO) were imposing discriminatory 
administrative requirements on foreign performers.38 The investigation 
ended after the accused parties modified their administrative requirements 
and the UK company withdrew its complaint. 
UCMR-ADA, a CRO that manages the rights of composers, was 
suspended by ORDAin 2011 because of irregularities in the way royalties 
were distributed resulting from a lack of an integrated IT system.39 The 
distribution was temporarily resumed by court order, but the main issues 
remain unsolved. 
9. Netherlands 
In 2009, Dutch CRO Buma/Stemra lost a substantial amount of the 
money it collected for artists in the stock market. These losses resulted in 
the society withholding 10.4% of each artist's payout.40 
In 2011, Dutch anti-piracy group Bescherming Rechten Entertainment 
lndustrie Nederland (BREIN) used a song by Melchoir Rieveldt in an anti-
piracy video. Rieveldt had only given BREIN permission to use the song in 
very limited circumstances: to be screened at a local film festival. 
Subsequently, however, the anti-piracy message was attached to millions of 
Dutch DVDs without any further compensation to the composer. BREIN 
denies involvement with the subsequent uses. When Rieveldt contacted the 
CRO that represented him, Buma/Stemra, for help collecting compensation 
for these uses, he got no response. Later Riveldt was contacted by Jochem 
Gerrits, a member of the Buma/Stemra board, who said he would be happy 
ww.orda.rolfisiereffoate%200GC%20date%20control%20pt%202010/COPYROIPV%2020 
II %20COPYRO.pdf. 
37. ORDA Announcement, Oficiul Roman pentru Drepturile de Autor (Jan. 31, 
20 12), available at http://www.orda.ro/default.aspx?pagina= 7 49. 
38. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Welcomes Steps Taken by 
Collective Rights Management Bodies in Hungary and Romania to Improve Competition 
(Mar. II, 20 II), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/II I 
284&type=HTML. 
39. Robert Bucur, ORDA Director General, Oficiul Romim Pentru Drepturile de 
Autor Decizie (Sept. 28, 2011), available at http://ucmr-ada.ro/fisiereldecizia_259.pdf. 
40. Music Rights Society Loses on Investments, DUTCH NEWS (May 26, 2009), 
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/05/music_rights_society_loses_on.php. 
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to alert the board to Rieveldt's situation, if the composer assigned the music 
to Gerrits' publishing company and gave Gerrits one third of the estimated 
$1.3 million in royalties. A local news organization recorded Gerrits making 
the demand.41 
IO. Belgium 
Through a series of increasingly absurd stunts, the satirical television 
show Basta in Belgium caught Belgian CRO Societe d' Auteurs Belge-
Belgische Auteurs Maatschappij (SABAM) charging licensing fees for 
fictional bands. Basta made up a list of bands and songs and called SABAM 
to see how much it would charge for these fictional songs. Since the songs 
did not exist, SABAM should not have been able to claim any fees. Five 
days later, a representative called back to claim that all the songs were 
"100% protected." After paying the fee, Basta attempted to register to 
collect any funds SABAM took on their behalf. At this point, SABAM 
refused to pay out; it was happy to collect money for a band that it never 
heard of, but unwilling to distribute the funds.42 
I I. France 
The French Standing Committee of Corporate Control Management and 
Distribution Rights (SPRD) releases annual reports that highlight problems 
with CROs, including executive compensation rates, which constitute a 
significant portion of overhead fees, and the structure of management fees, 
whose multiple overlapping layers tend to inflate rates and inefficiencies 
through redundancies and waste. The SPRD is charged with ensuring 
greater transparency after the salary scandal and stepping-down of SACEM 
president Bernard Miyet. 
The 2010 report detailed the notably high salaries for senior executives 
despite being in an era of financial crisis, while the 2011 report focused on 
the complex financial flows among CROs. The 2012 report urges artists to 
demand greater accountability, and encourages reorganization, both for the 
benefit of artists and to achieve greater efficiency and transparency in CRO 
management. 43 
41. Emesto, Copyright Corruption Scandal Surrounds Anti-Piracy Campaign, 
TORRENTFREAK (Dec. I, 2011 ), http://torrentfreak.com/copyright-corruption-scandal-surroun 
ds-anti-piracy-campaign-11120 I/. 
42. Enigmax, Music Royalty Society Collects Money for Fake Artists Bathroom 
Equipment and Food, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 8, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/music-royalty-
society-collects-money-for -fake-artists-bathroom-equipment -and-food-11 0308/. 
43. Guilaume Champeau, Un rapport official denonce Ia "galaxie" Sacem et ses 
montages, NUMERAMA (May 4, 2011,7:31 PM), http://www.numerama.com/magazine/187 
03-un-rapport-officiel-denonce-la-galaxie-sacem-et-ses-montages.html; Sophian Fanen, 
Culture: La Cour des comptes reclame une gestion des droits vraiment collective, ECRANS 
(Apr. 26, 2012, I :41 PM), http://www.ecrans.fr/Gestion-collective-les-artistes, 14562.html; 
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12. Russia 
Under the Russian Copyright Statute of 1993 an unlimited number of 
CROs ·were allowed to represent authors in absentia, without specific 
contracts. ''The situation allowed for extensive gaming and abuse. In several 
cases, publishers and distributors registered as [CROs] and began 
publishing and distributing work-often without the consent of the rights 
holders. Nonpayment of fees and royalties was a recurring problem in this 
context .... "44 AllofMP3 was one exploiter of these provisions. It obtained 
licenses from two legally licensed Russian CROs and sold music online to 
international audiences at low prices, realizing a profit. The legitimacy of 
these licenses was challenged, but the owner of AllofMP3, Denis Kvasov, 
was acquitted for lack of evidence of actual illegal activity. 
Amendments in 2008 introduced a process of state accreditation of 
CROs; only the accredited CROs would be able to represent authors and 
rights holders without formal agreements Because the law did not have a 
retroactive effect, several of the CROs in existence before 2008 continued 
to operate. 
The accreditation process in Russia has introduced a new set of problems 
related to competition among CROs. "In 2008, RAO [Russian Authors 
Society] affiliates launched the Russian Organization for Intellectual 
Property (VOIS) in a bid to become the accredited organization for 
'neighboring rights,' such as those granted to broadcasters or producers. 
Concerns about the VOIS's lack of transparency regarding royalties and 
governance, however, led many producers to back a separate group in the 
accreditation process, the Equal Rights Phonographic Alliance (RFA). By 
all accounts, the political jockeying for accreditation was intense. The 
RFA's general director, Vadim Botnaruk, was assassinated during this 
period, although clear motives for the crime were never established. 
Ultimately, the VOIS won accreditation in 2009. The RFA continues to 
operate, however, grandfathered under the 2008 law, and is still the 
preferred organization of many foreign CRM societies."45 
13. Africa 
Because African CROs are managed by the local government or are 
government-sanctioned monopolies, they are not accountable to their 
members. As Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder note in their study of 
African intellectual property industries, "[r]estricting competition provides 
Marc Rees, Un rapport denonce les coOts tordus des societes d'ayants droit, PC IN PACT (Apr. 
12, 2010, 2:57PM), http://www.pcinpact.com/news/56327-hadopi-crise-cour-compte-control 
e.htm. 
44. Olga Sezneva & Joe Karaganis, Russia, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING 
EcoNOMIES 149, 164 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011). 
45. /d. at 165. 
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little incentive for collecting agencies to respond to artists' concern. 
According to the Africa Music Project, 'distribution [of royalties], when it 
takes place, is a political process rather than an objective one. ""'6 
Additionally, "government involvement with collective rights organizations 
can also threaten the independence of musicians. In fact, artists in Ghana 
have accused the Chairman of the Ministry of Culture-controlled Copyrights 
Office of withholding payments from artists in an attempt to influence the 
content of their music."47 
14. Kenya 
The high administrative costs of the Music Copyright Society of Kenya 
(MCSK), the CRO that acts on behalf of music composers, prompted the 
Kenya Copyright Board (KECOBO) in 2011 to deregister MCSK.48 
KECOBO found that MCSK had expenses of Shl37 million against 
revenues of Sh185 million, leaving it with only Sh48 million to distribute in 
royalties to the rightsholders. Under KECOBO guidelines, only 30% of 
monies collected by CROs can be spent on administrative costs, with the 
remaining 70% distributed to rightsholders. MCSK, however, had the 
opposite ratio, with 70% of collections going to administrative costs, and 
only 30% reaching the rightsholders. 
15. South Africa 
The Copyright Review Commission (CRC), established by the South 
Africa Ministry of Trade and Industry, identified serious problems with the 
operation of CROs in South Africa. A major focus of the CRC was 
determining why, nine years after the enactment of performance rights in 
sounds recordings, "not a cent had been paid in royalties to musicians and 
record companies."49 Among the many problems identified were multiple 
collecting societies operating within the same set of rights, inadequate 
statutory protection for the interests of rights holders, disputes between the 
Registrar of Copyrights and the CROs, and the CROs' failure to comply 
with applicable regulations. For example, one CRO's administrative cost 
ratio was 30%, significantly higher than the 20% ratio allowed by 
regulation.50 The South African Music Performing Rights Association 
46. Schultz & Van Gelder, supra note 13, at 132. 
47. /d. 
48. VNZOMO, The Fate of Music Copyright Society of Kenya (MCSK), IP KENYA 
(Jan. 9, 2012), http://ipkenya. wordpress.com/20 12/01/09/the-fate-of-music-copyright-society 
-of-kenya-mcsk/. 
49. Republic of South Africa Dep't of Trade & Indus., COPYRIGHT REVIEW 
COMMISSION REPORT 3 (2011 ), available at http://www.info.gov.za!view/DownloadFileActio 
n?id=I73384. 
50. !d. at 5. 
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(SAMPRA), the CRO that represented the record industry, engaged in 
protracted litigation with the Registrar of Copyrights over the record labels 
refusal to equitably share royalties with perforrners.51 
The CRC report also discusses in detail the collapse of the South African 
Recording Rights Association (SARRAL), the CRO for the mechanical 
rights of composers. Many composers lost "huge amounts of monies" after 
the liquidation of SARRAL because of insolvency.52 External auditors could 
not verify receipts and distributions for a three-year period: ''The amounts 
involved are significant and warranted a formal investigation. Based on the 
investigations carried out, the members were never provided with 
satisfactory answers as to what happened to the money."53 Furthermore, the 
CRC stated that SARRAL's change of business model and accounting 
practices constituted a breach of contract with its members. The CRC noted 
that "SARRAL's collapse was preceded by corporate governance failure."54 
Similar governance failures exist at other South Africa CROs: lack of 
independent directors, lack of internal audits, limited disclosure of executive 
director's remuneration, lack of annual reports, and outdated constitutive 
documents.55 
16. Senegal 
Artists in Senegal accuse the Bureau Senegalaise du Droits d' Auteurs 
(BSDA) of overcharging for its services and inconsistent royalty 
payments.56 
17. Nigeria 
A long-running dispute between the Copyright Society of Nigeria and 
the Music Copyright Society of Nigeria concerning how to manage the 
collection of license fees resulted in the Attorney General suspending the 
authority of both CROs to collect license fees.57 This in turn caused rights 
holders to lose significant amounts of revenue. 
51. !d. at 19. 
52. /d. at 46. 
53. /d.at47. 
54. /d. at 52. A chart beginning at page 47 of the Report details the various failures 
of corporate governance that plagued SARRAL. See generally id. at 47-48. 
55. A chart beginning at page 49 summarizes the governance failings of the three 
major South African CROs. See generally id. at 49-52. 
56. Schultz & Van Gelder, supra note 13, at 131. 
57. See COSON illegal until,V ANGUARD (Visited Mar. 10, 2011 ), http://www.vangua 
rdngr.com/20 11/03/coson-illegal-untiU. 
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18. China 
The China Audio-Visual Copyright Association (CAVCA), the CRO 
representing the performers of music, collected fees that should have been 
paid to the Music Copyright Society of China, the CRO representing the 
composers. This led to litigation.58 
19. Australia 
The Australian reprographic CRO Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) 
spent more in 2009 on staff salaries than on distributions to authors.59 The 
CRO spent $9.4 million on salaries, including $350,000 for its chief 
executive, while allocating only $9.1 million to authors. CAL also paid $76 
million in license fees to publishers, but the Australian Society of Authors 
questioned whether the publishers "carry out their legal obligation to pass 
on money" to authors. Of the $114 million collected by CAL in 2009, more 
than $80 million came from schools, libraries, and ·universities. 
C. Lack of Transparency and Choice 
Without a reasonable degree of transparency, artists cannot know for 
sure whether they are being treated fairly. Without a range of choices (of 
licenses, licensing terms, agents, and so on), artists miss opportunities to 
connect with their audience and are limited in how they can monetize their 
work. Moreover, without a choice of how their rights are administered, 
artists have no way to impose market discipline on CROs by walking away 
or trying new models. 
1. Canada 
In 2007, Professor Martin Friedland conducted a study of Canadian CRO 
Access Copyright's distribution policy and methodology at the request of its 
board of directors.60 He found that 
The present distribution scheme is extremely complicated and I found it 
surprisingly difficult to understand how the system worked. I have 
undertaken a number of other public policy studies over the years, 
58. Luo Yanjie, Will Collective Management Organization Be Liable for Its 
Unauthorised License?, BRIDGE IP LAW COMMENTARY (May 10, 2012), http://www.chinaipla 
wyer.com/collective-management-organization-liable-unauthorised-liscense/. 
59. Luke Slattery, Copyright Staff Get More Than They Give to Authors and Artists, 
THE AUSTRALIAN (Feb. 18, 20 I 0, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.eom.au/arts/copyrigh 
t-staff-get-more-than-they-give-to-authors-and-artists/story-e6frg8n6-1225831556653. 
60. Martin Friedland, Report to Access Copyright on Distribution of Royalties, 
ACCESSCOPYRIGHT 2 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.accesscopyright.ca/media/83 
59/access_copyright_report_ --_february _15 _2007 .pdf. 
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including such reasonably complex topics as pension reform, secunt1es 
regulation, and national security, and have never encountered anything 
quite as complex as the Access Copyright distribution system. It is far 
from transparent. 
Very little is written down in a consolidated, cohesive, comprehensive, or 
comprehensible manner. There is no manual describing in detail how the 
distribution system operates. There is a one-page description on the web 
site, but it is less than the bare bones of the system. The policy that 
contracts between the publisher and the creator may override the splits 
established by the board is not mentioned in that description, but is 
mentioned in the affiliation agreement available through the web site. The 
staff has produced very brief descriptions of the models used for 
distributing the money, but they do not go into the type of detail that is 
necessary to develop a good understanding of the policies and procedures, 
and none of what is written is readily available to affiliates.61 
705 
After describing the many flaws of the electronic rights management 
system, Professor Friedland observed that "Members of the present board 
are the first to admit that they do not have a good grasp of how the system 
operates." He added that "there is little institutional memory and very little 
has been properly documented either on paper or electronically." He 
explains that 
The principal reason for this complexity is that the details for distribution 
have been worked out over the past 20 years or so as a series of 
compromises, accommodations and adjustments. It is not just publishers 
against creators, but also compromises, accommodations and adjustments 
within the creator community as well as within the group of publishers. 
There is not always uniformity of interest within each community. What 
might help one genre financially will ordinarily harm another.62 
Professor Friedland bluntly stated that "power politics has also played a 
significant role in the development of the distribution scheme."63 
CROs use a number of different methods of managing and licensing the 
rights under their care. Many organizations will only license authors for 
their entire body of work. Access Copyright in Canada has proposed a non-
voluntary licensing method that would make it the only entity able to collect 
royalties on behalf of a category of work, forcing creators to choose 
between it and no royalties. Even less voluntary are statutory licensing 
schemes. 
Canadian author Russell McOrmond raised this concern: "Where an 
author wishes to use alternative business models (such as the model I use, 
61. /d.at5. 
62. /d. at 6. 
63. /d. 
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which is charge once for material that is then released royalty-free under a 
public license), that choice should be respected. Respect for the choices of 
authors necessitates a rejection of non-voluntary licensing systems."64 
Recent Canadian copyright legislation transfers to Access Copyright the 
rights to authorize digital reproduction of the works of its members even 
when the members never authorized Access Copyright to grant such 
licenses on their behalf. Unless the rightsholder expressly opts out, any 
rightsholder that has authorized Access Copyright to administer 
reprographic reproduction for educational use is deemed to have authorized 
administration of digital reproduction rights for that purpose as well.65 
Canadian copyright scholar Ariel Katz characterizes the provision as a 
"copyright grab" by Access Copyright, which further "entrenches Access 
Copyright as a collector of what is in effect an 'education tax. "'66 
2. Brazil 
In 2009, Brazilian CRO ECAD retained BOO Trevisian Audites 
Independentes to audit its books. After initiating the audit, Trevisian asked 
ECAD for a number of documents, including contracts between ECAD and 
other companies. Trevisian also asked for a detailed description of ECAD's 
systems for collecting and distributing royalties. ECAD's board of directors 
refused to deliver the requested information. Instead, it retained another 
firm, Martinelli Auditores, to perform a much more limited audit.67 
3. European Commission's Proposed Directive 
In July 2012, the European Commission proposed a new directive to 
address the many problems of CROs. These problems include difficulty in 
adapting to online environments, operating internationally, lack of 
transparency in their financials, and lack of rightholder input on rights 
management. In the explanatory memorandum justifying the Directive, the 
Commission stated that "concerns have been expressed with regard to the 
accountability of certain societies to their members in general, and to the 
management of their finances in particular." 68 It remains to be seen whether 
the Directive, if adopted, will actually alleviate the problems that prompted 
64. Russell McOrmond, Independent Authors Just Wanting a Little Respect... From 
Fellow Creators and Collective Societies, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT CANADA (Mar. 5, 2006, 7:53 
PM), http://www.digital-copyright.ca/node/1979. 
65. Ariel Katz, Bill C-1 I and the Big Access Copyright Grab, ARIELKATZ (Mar. 
I 0, 2012), http://arielkatz.org/archives/1347. 
66. Id. 
67. Comissiio Parlamentar de Inqw?rito, supra note 31, at 884. 
68. Press Release, European Comm'n, Copyright: Commission proposes easier 
music licensing in the Single Market (July II, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pres 
sReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/I2n72&format=HTML&aged=O&Ianguage=en&guiLang 
uage=EN. 
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its drafting; indeed, artists are already expressing concern about the 
proposal. 69 
Rightsholders voiced complaints about CROs at the public hearing the 
European Commission held when developing the Directive mentioned 
above. The Motion Picture Association observed that rightsholders became 
"unintended victims" when disputes with CROs concerning accounting for 
collections or distributions were not subject to third party resolution.70 The 
RTL Group, a European broadcaster and television producer, stated: "Let's 
be clear: collecting societies are not owners of the rights that they represent 
but fiduciaries to the right owners-nothing more and nothing less. 
Collecting societies have the obligation to put in motion what is in the 
interest of the members and right holders represented. Collecting societies 
are not a licensee in the traditional sense and may therefore not confuse 
their fiduciary remit with their own organizational interests.'m Concerns 
were raised about CROs' discriminatory practices, lack of transparency, and 
monopolistic leveraging. CROs collect "large quantities of black-box 
monies that are withheld for national purposes, thereby avoiding 
transparency and distribution.'m 
Some artists are already expressing concern over the proposed Directive. 
Bands like Radiohead and Pink Floyd list as chief among their concerns the 
CROs' ability to inappropriately retain money that should be distributed to 
artists. They stated that the Directive does not address this problem, and 
may even make it worse by allowing for a five-year grace period for 
difficult-to-attribute royalties.73 
4. France 
French CRO Societe des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs de musique 
(SACEM) requires music venues to pay for public performance rights, a 
portion of which SACEM will distribute to the artist only after the artist has 
69. See Claire Davenport, EU Copyright Law Plan Angers Radiohead, Pink Floyd, 
REUTERS (July II, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07111/eu-copyright-
idiNL6E8IB3QK20120711. 
70. Ted Shapiro, Motion Picture Ass'n, MPA Presentation at the Public Hearing on 
the Governance ofCRM in the EU (Apr. 23, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copy 
right/docs/managementlhearing20 1 00423/pane1_1_mpa_en. pdf. 
71. Christian Hauptmann, Deputy Gen. Counsel, RTL Group, Relationship between 
Collective Rights Managers and Commercial Users (Apr. 23, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/copyright/docs/managementlhearing20 1 00423/panel_3 _rtl %20group_en. pdf. 
72. Bendik Hofseth, Int'l Council of Authors & Composers of Music, Presentation at 
the Public Hearing on the Governance of Collective Rights Management in the EU (Apr. 23, 
20 1 0), http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_market/copyright/docs/managementlheari ng20 I 00423/pa 
nel_l_ciam_en.pdf. 
73. Davenport, supra note 69. 
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paid SACEM membership fees. 74 Similarly, CD manufacturers in France 
may not press COs without prior authorization from SACEM, even if the 
artist himself is producing the CD.75 This again requires an artist to pay 
SACEM a membership fee should the artist wish to collect a portion of his 
mechanical royalties. 
French band Uniform Motion notes that instead of being able to work 
directly with the venue or CD manufacturer, SACEM "makes the artist pay 
them to have their own CD's [sic] manufactured, takes a portion of their 
live revenues and then uses the money to sue the guy who came to the gig 
and bought a CD!"76 
In 1998, SACEM entered into a lengthy conflict with the band Daft 
Punk, which wanted to transfer only some of its rights to the CRO. In 
response, the CRO claimed that this was impossible and refused to pay out 
royalties collected on behalf of the band.77 
5. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom recently collected and published responses to the 
Hargreaves Review of intellectual property in the digital age. A number of 
contributors have come forward and said that significant portions of their 
comments were removed. One contributor, Andrew Norton, stated that a list 
he had provided of news stories about CROs pursuing small businesses for 
minor offenses was removed entirely.78 
6. India 
Indian IP attorney Nikhil Krishnamurthy has raised concerns regarding 
the transparency of the operations of Phonographic Performance Ltd (PPL), 
a sound recording CRO registered under the Indian copyright law. While 
PPL implies that "over 95%" of international recorded music is represented 
74. See Remunate creators, SACEM, http://www.sacem.fr/cms/site/en!home/about-
sacem/remunate_creators (last visited July 10, 2013); Live entertainment in France in 2009: 
Overview and prospects, SACEM, http://www.sacem.fr/files/content/sites/en/files/mediacent 
er/about_sacem/press_office/study _spectacle_ vi vant_sacem_20 I Oapri I_anglais. pdf (last visit 
July I 0, 20 13). 
75. See Authorization to produce a record, SACEM, http://www.sacem.fr/cms/site/e 
n!home/users/useful-informations-record/authorization-to-produce-a-record (last visited July 
10, 2013). 
76. Jean-Pierre and the Copyright Collection Society, UNIFORM MOTION (Sept. 15, 
20 12), http://uniformmotion.tumblr.com/post/315279021 02/jean-pierre-and-the-copyright-co 
llection-society. 
77. Remi Bouton, SACEM Decides Not to Pay Daft Punk, BILLBOARD, Oct. 17, 
1998, at 12. 
78. Andrew Norton, UK /PO Redacts Responses Critical of Rights Societies, 
POLITICS & P2P (July 26, 2012, 9:58 PM), http://www.ktetch.eo.uk/20 12/07/uk-ipo-redacts-r 
esponses-critical-of.html. 
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in its catalog, the extent of PPL' s authority to collect fees for foreign-owned 
sound recordings is unclear." Additionally, it does not publicly specify its 
license rates.79 
7. China 
Chinese rightsholders have long complained about their CROs' lack of 
transparency on financial matters. They also object to the lack of input on 
rights management. Some rightsholders even considered bringing antitrust 
claims against the CROs. Nonetheless, the draft revision of the Chinese 
copyright law expands the role of CROs through extended collective 
licensing. 80 
8. Russia 
The Russian Authors' Society (RAO) has been "repeatedly criticized for 
a lack of transparency and for failure to deliver collected funds to 
musicians."81 The organization keeps 30% of its gross licensing revenues. 
9. Ukraine 
In its latest Special 301 Report, an annual review of the state of 
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement at US trade partners, 
the Office of the US Trade Representative designated Ukraine a "Priority 
Foreign Country" (PFC) due in part to "the unfair, nontransparent 
administration of the system for collecting societies, which are responsible 
for collecting and distributing royalties to U.S. and other rights holders."82 
Ukraine is the first country in seven years to receive the PFC designation, 
which is "reserved by statute for countries with the most egregious IPR-
related acts, policies and practices with the greatest adverse impact on 
relevant U.S. products, and that are not entering into good faith negotiations 
or making significant progress in negotiations to provide adequate and 
effective IPR protection."83 
79. Nikhil Krishnamurthy, Indian Copyright Collecting Societies and Foreign 
Royalties: Whither Transparency?, SPICY IP (Nov. 18, 2008, 10:36 PM), http://spicyipindia.b 
logspot.ch/2008/II/indian-copyright-collecting-societies.html. 
80. Dou Xinying Jiang Shuo (~Wfijj ~iftJl), Collective management organizations 
are objects of antitrust review, PEOPLE's DAILY (Aug. 28,2013,8:05 AM), http://ip.people.c 
om.cn/n/2012/0828/cl36655-18849170.html; Luo Yanjie, supra note 58; Tang Yue, Industry 
Calls for Improved Collectives in Copyrights, CHINA DAILY (May 12, 2012, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-12/05/content_l5986119.htm. 
81. Sezneva & Karaganis, supra note 44, at 164-65. 
82. Demetrios Marantis, Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 2013 Special 301 Report 7 (May 20 13), available at http://www 
.ustr.gov/sites/default/ftles/050 12013%2020 13%20Special%2030 I %20Report.pdf. 
83. /d. at 6. 
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D. Bad for Songwriters 
Professor Ivan Reidel has demonstrated that the blanket licenses offered 
by CROs such as ASCAP and BMI to broadcasters harm most songwriters 
in two respects: 1) the supracompetitive cartel pricing of the blanket license 
requires broadcasters to devote more time to advertising, which in tum 
allows less airtime for the performance of songs by lesser-known artists; 
and 2) the blanket licenses eliminate price competition between songwriters, 
thereby encouraging broadcasters to play the most popular songs, and 
royalties to flow to the most popular songwriters.84 
Unlike a traditional monopolist, who is capable of reducing its output to 
increase profits, when PROs increase prices and force broadcasters to air 
more ads, the output that the PRO is restricting is both individual songs 
and songwriters. Those songwriters that are excluded from the market, 
don't get to participate in the larger royalty pie they helped generate by 
colluding, because all PROs distribute royalties based on actual air-time. 
Therefore, only songwriters whose songs are played receive the benefit of 
supra-competitive prices that all colluding songwriters helped create.85 
Reidel argues that "online transactional platforms can allow markets to 
vastly outperform blanket licenses-quantitatively and qualitatively-by 
allowing different songwriters to employ several pricing strategies 
simultaneously (e.g. auctions or any arbitrarily set price)."86 
The following are other specific examples of the problems CROs create 
for songwriters. 
1. United States 
Early in its history, ASCAP was free to distribute the royalties it 
collected according to whatever scheme it preferred. As Shourin Sen 
explains, in the 1930s, 
The prevailing distribution methods were skewed to ensure that career 
composers, rather than those composers whose songs were performed 
most, were granted the lion's share of the societies' intake .... [ASCAP] 
allowed entrenched composers aligned with industry powerbrokers to 
essentially gamer the royalties of less-established composers, whose 
compositions were often being performed more frequently. For example, 
in 1933 a member of the AS CAP directorate received $3,417 for 1,020 
84. Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising and 
Blanket Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 731,755 (2011). 
85. /d. at 751. 
86. /d. at 735. 
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performances, whereas Cole Porter was only paid $1,174 for 24,476 
performances. 87 
711 
Before the rise of radio and competition from the broadcaster-created 
BMI, US composer CRO ASCAP discriminated systematically against 
rural88 and African-American songwriters.89 This discrimination disserved 
audiences as well as songwriters, as these genres came to dominate popular 
culture once they were allowed widespread airplay. 
2. Norway 
Krakesjijlv is a Norwegian band that recently released an album for free 
on a torrent site as a means of promoting itself. TONO is a CRO that 
administers copyrights for music in Norway. According to TONO, it is 
owned and governed by its members. However, TONO forced Krakes~~Slv to 
remove its album from the site, claiming "'[t]he management contract in 
TONO means that we cannot allow the TONO members posting things on 
your own at some commercial sites. "'90 
3. France 
French composers allege that CRO SACEM stopped distributing 
royalties to its Jewish members during the Vichy regime -- a claim SACEM 
has contested.91 Documents from the time show that SACEM distributed a 
letter to its members asking "Jewish authors to identify themselves or face 
'internment in a concentration camp. "'92 
87. Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: 
A Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 233, 244-45 
(2007) (citing How ASCAP Cuts a Melon: Songwriters' Payoff for '33, VARIETY, Dec. 4, 
1935, at 37). 
88. DIANE PECKNOLD, THE SELLING SOUND: THE RISE OF THE COUNTRY MUSIC 
INDUSTRY 54-55 (2007) (explaining that in the 1930s so-called 'hillbilly' artists "were 
aggressively excluded from the unions, licensing societies, and social formations that 
constituted the music business .... Perhaps no single event in its history had more impact on 
hillbilly music than the clash between publishers and broadcasters that resulted in the 
formation of Broadcast Music, Inc., and the temporary boycott of ASCAP music on the air"). 
89. CATHERINE SQUIRES, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE MEDIA 147 (2009) ("Blues 
and jazz performed by blacks was termed 'race music.' The music on these records was 
usually not included in the ASCAP catalogue, because ASCAP rarely allowed Black 
members"). 
90. Jared Moya, Norwegian Royalty Group: You Can't Upload Own Music to Pirate 
Bay, ZEROPAID (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/87293/norwegian-royalty-
group-you-cant-upload-own-music-to-pirate-bay/. 
91. Remi Bouton, SACEM Says Documents Prove WWII Payments, BILLBOARD, 
July 10, 1999, at 95. 
92. /d. 
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4. Lithuania 
After complaining that the Lithuanian Copyright Protection Association, 
LATGA-A, was not fairly distributing license fees to them, a group of 
music authors in 2012 formed the Music Authors Rights Association, 
NAT A. The dispute between the two groups became so heated that the 
Ministry of Culture had to intervene.93 
5. Israel 
Israeli CRO PIL was formed as a result of incumbent CRO IFPI Israel's 
refusal to accept independent producers of Middle-Eastern music.94 Ariel 
Katz reports that at the time IFPI members claimed the excluded 
songwriters were making inferior music, but there may also be an economic 
explanation: once a CRO reaches a critical mass of popular songwriters, 
they may exclude smaller songwriters who will add trivial revenues to the 
collective in order to avoid sharing revenues with them. 
E. Bad for Performers, Venues, and Journalists 
The marketplace for music copyright is not neatly divided between 
creators on one h~nd and consumers on the other. In addition to songwriters 
and their audiences, there are also performers (who are often writers 
themselves), venues, and journalists, among other stakeholders. While some 
songwriters may benefit from CROs when they receive royalties for 
performance or reproduction of their works (assuming ·they are fairly 
compensated, which is not necessarily the case), performers and the venues 
and journalists that support them are often on the wrong side of CRO efforts 
to extract maximum profit from the music ecosystem. When CROs mistreat 
performers and venues, they discourage dissemination and enjoyment of 
creative work and undermine the purpose of copyright. The injustice is 
particularly acute when the performer is also a writer, relying on revenue 
from performance to help subsidize her creative efforts. 
93. Danas Bereznickas, How Will the LATGA-A-NATA Scramble End, BAKARU 
EKPRESAS (Oct. 26, 2012, II :43 AM), http://www. ve.lt/naujienos/kultura/muzika/kuo-baigsis 
-latga-a-ir-nata-pestynes-831753/; Press Release, Seven Entertainment, Major Lithuanian 
Event Coordinators Launch Collaboration with NATA (Apr. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.seven.lt/en/news/major-lithuanian-event-coordinators-launch-collaboration-with-
nata.html?p= 16 ("The NATA agency was established by music writers dissatisfied with the 
activities of LATGA-A"). 
94. See generally Ariel Katz, Monopoly and Competition in the Collective 
Administration of Public Performance Rights, 2 HAIFA L. REv. 551 (2006). 
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I. United States 
The Harry Fox Agency, the U.S. CRO for mechanical licenses, claimed 
that the Thailand Youth Orchestra (Siam Sinfonica) infringed copyright by 
posting a video of its performance of the Radetsky March by Johann 
Strauss.95 The Radetsky March is 164 years old. Although more recent 
arrangements might be under copyright, the Y otith Orchestra performed the 
original arrangement, which is in the public domain. 
Richard Phillips is an independent folk musician who performs his own 
original songs and arrangements of traditional Irish folk songs. In the early 
2000's, he convinced a restaurant with no other musicians to give him a 
regular performance slot. The restaurant stopped hosting the performances 
when it received a letter from BMI which indicated that "'whatever music 
you perform to benefit your business, its public performance requires a 
license. "'96 
Richard Phillips contacted BMI directly, and attempted to explain that he 
was the only performer who played at the restaurant and he did not play any 
songs to which BMI had rights. BMI claimed there was no way he could 
know that. When he asked them for "'a statement, in writing, that I am at 
liberty to perform my own songs, copyrighted in my name, and traditional 
folk songs, in the public domain, anywhere I want to, whether or not the 
venue has a license from BMI,"' the BMI representative replied "'we're not 
going to give you that."' Phillips ultimately wrote to his congressman, who 
obtained an opinion from an attorney at the U.S. Copyright Office 
explaining that BMI could not demand a license for performance of works it 
does not represent. The restaurant owner nevertheless stopped featuring live 
music, citing the hassle of fighting with BMI. 
Zoe Keating is a cellist and songwriter who tours regularly in many 
countries. When performing at a U.S. venue, she saw that the venue 
deducted an $86 dollar ASCAP fee. 97 Zoe contacted ASCAP to ask how she 
could go about claiming her portion of that fee, since it is meant to support 
songwriters of the songs performed -- in this case, her. The ASCAP 
representative informed Zoe that it only pays royalties to the top 200 
grossing concert tours, live symphonic and recital concerts, and winners of 
the ambiguous "ASCAP Plus Cash Award," which has no clear criteria. 
As Keating writes: "Every day, thousands of venues are required to pay a 
percentage of their gross ticket sales to ASCAP who then gives that money 
95. Cory Doctorow, Harry Fox Agency Claims Copyright on Strauss, BOINGBOING 
(Nov. 1, 2012, 8:39 PM), http:/lboingboing.net/2012/11/01/harry-fox-agency-claims-copyri.h 
tml. 
96. Richard Hayes Phillips, How One Independent Musician Defeated BMI, 
WooDPECKER (2003), http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/phillips.html. 
97. Zoe Keating, Another Post Where I Attempt to Understand the Performance 
Royalty System, ZOE KEATING (Mar. 23, 2012), http:/lzoekeating.tumblr.corn/post/1979651 
9069/another-post-where-i-attempt-to-understand-the. 
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to .. .let's look here on Poll star and find the highest-grossing concerts for 
2011 .... U2, Taylor Swift, Kenny Chesney, Lady Gaga, Bon Jovi, etc." 
In 2010, ASCAP filed suit against Connolly's Pub and Restaurant for 
failure to properly license music performances. It filed suit in the name of 
one of its affected artists, Bruce Springsteen. He was not involved in the 
decision to sue this restaurant and was so uncomfortable with ASCAP' s 
behavior that he demanded that his name be removed from the complaint.98 
In a 2011 blog post, Florida attorney Allan Gregory relays an unpleasant 
encounter between a friend (a restauranteur to whom he gives the 
pseudonym "John") and an attorney from performance rights CRO BMI.99 
According to John, his restaurant began having local bands play original 
songs at the restaurant on Friday nights. The move was a success, but John 
ended the local music night when a lawyer from BMI stopped by to demand 
the restaurant purchase a $3,000 blanket license. When John argued that the 
band played all original music, the BMI attorney claimed a license was 
necessary for even the most minor uses, such as "a Led Zeppelin riff while 
they tune-up their instruments." John suspended live music night 
indefinitely and, in John's words, "Net result? Our customers suffered, local 
music suffered. A complete lose-lose situation." 
Somethin's Brewin' was a cafe bookstore that had weekly lunchtime sets 
by a local musician and monthly open mic nights. Neither had an admission 
charge. Eventually ASCAP and SESAC got wind of this and demanded the 
owner pay a license fee. Owner Lorraine Carboni offered to have 
performers agree to perform only their own works or works that are in the 
public domain. This did not satisfy the CROs, and Ms. Carboni was forced 
to post the following sign: "Due to concerns with music license companies 
we are forced to take all music entertainment off line until all concerns can 
be addressed ... this includes our Friday Night Entertainment Series [and] 
Thursday Lunch with Tom." 100 
Musician Howie Newman, a long time BMI member, left the 
organization due to growing frustration that small venues were canceling 
performances because they could not afford the licensing fees demanded by 
the CROs. Newman told a reporter, "It seems like this is set up for the rich 
to get richer, it's not set up to protect the little guy. I don't feel the intent of 
this policy and the regulations fit the small venues. It seems like they are 
closing down these little places, where people can go and enjoy the music 
98. Press Release, Bruce Springsteen, Statement (Feb. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.shorefire.com/index.php?a=pressrelease&o=3650. 
99. Allan Gregory, Music Copyright Police Ruin Artists' Gigs (and Coconut Curry), 
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 8, 201 1), http://torrentfreak.com/music-copyright-police-ruin-artists-g 
igs-and-coconut-curry- I I 1008/. 
100. Cindy Dow, Copyright Issue Brings an End to Music at Cafe, MIDDLEBORO 
GAZEITE(Apr. 29, 2010, I :41 PM), http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.diVarticle? 
AID=/20 I 00429/PUB04/4290397/- I /pub04. 
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for short money. Do they have any awareness that this is decimating the 
small organizations?"101 
2. United Kingdom 
CROs generally cannot keep track of each use and distribution of the 
works under their care, so they use statistical sampling methods to estimate 
proper division of revenue. Journalist and academic Andrew Dubber 
observed that there is a fundamental data problem with PRS (Performing 
Right Society) Music in Britain, the CRO that licenses performances on 
behalf of songwriters, in that statistical methods designed to determine how 
much money members deserve inevitably favor more popular artists. He 
gives the example, "if your music gets played on the radio five times, but 
only one of those times are counted, the collection society will assume, 
based on statistical probability, that it was not your song but, let's say, Elton 
John's that got played those other four times."102 
One of the most detailed studies of income distribution in the music 
industry used data from PRS to reveal that 80% of performance rights 
owners earned less than £1000 from performance royalties in 1993, while a 
mere 10% of owners received 90% of the total amount of distributions. 103 
3. Ireland 
In 2010, the Irish Music Rights Organization (IMRO), decided to make 
music bloggers who failed to pay an Online Exploitation License a priority. 
Many of these blogs were small amateur websites with no commercial 
revenue. Additionally, many of the MP3s they used were provided gratis by 
bands and their labels for promotional purposes. Blogger Nialler9 
summarized the situation as follows, "Like many I thought that MP3s which 
were cleared by bands and labels for promo were provided as is-gratis and 
without any attachments or additional requirements other than to promote 
the band and song. Y'know, the same way an entire music blogosphere and 
a digital PR industry has been allowed to grow up over the course of the last 
10 years thinking the same." 104 
101. /d. 
I 02. Andrew Dubber, How to Solve Royalty Collection Societies, MUSIC THINK TANK 
(June 13, 201 0), http://www.musicthinktank.comlbloglhow-to-solve-royalty-collection-societ 
ies.html. 
103. Birgitte Anderson et al., Rents, Rights, N'Rhythm: Cooperation, Conflict and 
Capabilities in the Music Industry, 14 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 513 (2007). 
I 04. Rossa McMahon, IMRO vs. The Blogs: Collective Licensing of Music, A 
CLATTER OF THE LAW (Apr. 29, 20 I 0), http://aclatterofthelaw.com/201 0/04/29/imro-vs-the-bl 
ogs-collective-licensing-of-music/. 
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4. Russia 
Russian CRO RAO has sued promoters of a Beyonce concert held in 
Moscow where she performed only her original compositions, alleging they 
should have purchased a performance rights license for the event. 105 The 
same CRO successfully sued the promoters of a concert by Deep Purple and 
obtained a fee of $15,000 for failure to license public performance of the 
band's own original songs. 
F. CROs Can Be Slow To Adapt to Digital Technologies 
Even major labels can be frustrated with CROs acting against their 
interests. Edgar Berger, a Sony Music executive, spoke publicly about his 
frustration with German CRO Gesellschaft fiir musikalische Auffiihrungs-
und mechanische Vervielfaltigungsrechte (GEMA) for its refusal to license 
to Y ouTube. He believed that the refusal to license was preventing artists 
from making money from the lucrative ContentiD system. 106 
In an effort to innovate in the field of digital licensing, record company 
EMI decided to go in-house for management of online licensing of its April 
Music Catalog, reclaiming those rights from CRO ASCAP. 107 EMI Music 
Publishing Chairman Roger Faxon said the move was not an indictment of 
ASCAP in particular, but rather a general problem with dividing digital 
rights across the various CROs that manage them. EMI hopes to achieve 
more efficient licensing by retaining all of its digital rights. 
ll. HOW CROS HARM USERS 
CROs are intended to address the market failures that prevent would-be 
licensees from making valuable arrangements with would-be licensors. 
CROs should therefore be equally beneficial to both sides of copyright 
transactions. In reality, CROs often pursue profit for themselves at the 
expense of both artists and users. We have seen how CROs can misallocate 
profits and mismanage their portfolios of rights to the detriment of authors; 
Part ll will show the ways that CROs abuse their power at the expense of 
the public, who are the ultimate intended beneficiaries of copyright. CROs 
105. Vladimir Kozlov, Russian Collecting Society Sues Over Beyonce Concert, 
BILLBOARD (Feb. 19, 20 I 0, 12:00 AM), http://www.billboard.com/bi:zlarticles/news/121 097 
3/russian-collecting-society-sues-over-beyonce-concert. 
106. Emesto, Sony Music Boss: Censored YouTube Videos Cost Us Millions, 
TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 24, 20 12), http://torrentfreak.com/sony-music-boss-censored-youtube-
videos-cost-us-millions-120224/. 
107. Ed Miller, EM/ releases AS CAP in Rights Reshuffle, MuSIC WEEK (May 9, 2011, 
12:45 PM), http://www.musicweek.com/news/read/emi-releases-ascap-in-rights-reshuffle/04 
5640. 
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harm users in two primary ways: monopolistic conduct and aggressive 
enforcement actions. 
A. Monopolistic Conduct 
Because CROs are often the only seller of required licenses, they can 
demand monopoly prices from users with no choice but to pay. The 
following are just a few examples of this monopolistic conduct. 
1. Canada 
In 2010, Canadian CRO Access Copyright proposed to increase its 
annual license fee by 1300%, then tried to mute objections by changing its 
complaint reporting system. 108 The rate hike, which required authorization 
by the Canadian Copyright Board, was opposed vociferously by Canadian 
universities. However, in 2012, the Association of Universities and Colleges 
of Canada (AUCC) and Access Copyright negotiated a new agreement that 
increased the annual per student licensing cost from $3.38 to $26. Many 
Canadian educators opposed the deal's extraordinary rate increase as well as 
several of its terms. 109 In an effort to discourage universities from opting out 
of the Access Copyright blanket license and relying instead on fair dealing 
and one-by-one licenses, AUCC and Access Copyright negotiated a 
"Limited Time Offer of Discounted Pricing on Retroactive Payments" that 
promised a stiff penalty in the form of retroactive license fees for 
institutions who did not accede immediately to the negotiated license 
terms. 110 
Critics of the deal pointed out that the new $26 per student fee is 
significantly higher than the $3.56 per student fee the CCC sought from 
Georgia State University (and the $0.06 per student fees actually paid by 
GSU to the CCC). 111 
For years the Access Copyright license has included rights that have 
already been granted through the Canadian copyright law. "The licence 
attempts to subsume non-infringing activity such as fair dealing (which 
108. Howard Knopf, Access Copyright Strikes Back re Status of99 of 10/ Objectors, 
EXCESS COPYRIGHT (Sept. 30, 20 I 0, I 2:09 AM), http://excesscopyright.blogspot.com/20 I 0/ 
09/access-copyright-strikes-back-at-99-of.html. 
109. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Opposition Mounts to AUCC-Access Copyright Deal, 
MICHAEL GEIST (May 14, 2012), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6484/196/; Letter 
from Christian Rouillard, President, Ass'n of Professors of the University of Ottawa, to Jean-
Yves Leduc and Leslie Weir, University of Ottawa (May 30, 2012), available at http://www. 
apuo.uottawa.ca/info/20 I 2-05-30_APUO _position_ Copyright. pdf. 
110. Ariel Katz, The Best Possible Outcome for Universities, Really?, ARIEL KATZ 
(Apr. I 7, 2012), http://arielkatz.org/archives/1673. 
Ill. Howard Knopf, AUCC Settlement with Access Copyright-Questions and 
Answers-or Still More Ques]ions?, EXCESS COPYRIGHT (May 2, 2012, 7:34 PM), 
http://excesscopyright.blogspot.ca/20 12/05/aucc-settlement-with-access-copyright.html. 
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allows copying for research and private study), interlibrary loans, copies 
made for preservation, and alternate format material for people with 
perceptual disabilities."112 Other problems with the license include 
substantial annual price increases without substantiation or negotiation; the 
burdensome administrative task of reporting all copies; and the exclusions 
list. 113 
In the wake of the rate hike and a series of landmark court decisions 
favoring educational fair use, all K-12 schools in Canada ceased purchasing 
the Access Copyright blanket Iicense. 114 Access Copyright strongly disputes 
the schools' claim that fair dealing protects their uses, and says the action 
"will have a serious impact on Access Copyright's licencing revenue in 
2013, we are working hard on plans to address this challenge .... "115 
Access Copyright is just one of over 37 copyright CROs in Canada, and 
it is not the only one that has generated controversy. The Copyright Board 
of Canada approved Re:Sound, the music performance CRO, doubling its 
fee for the performance of recorded music at events -- such as weddings --
that include dancing. 116 As Ariel Katz has explained, the proliferation of 
collecting societies in Canada has created a system of taxing the public for 
private benefit, a system that answers directly to neither market competition 
nor democratic processes. 117 
2. United States 
American CROs ASCAP and BMI have been operating pursuant to 
antitrust consent decrees with the U.S. Department of Justice since 1941 and 
1966 respectively. 118 The Department of Justice brought the actions in 
response to ASCAP and BMI requiring broadcasters and other licensees to 
obtain a blanket license covering all performances of their entire catalogue. 
Under the consent decrees, the broadcaster can obtain a blanket license on a 
per program basis as opposed to a blanket license for all programs. 
112. Victoria Owen, The Librarian's Perspective on Collecting Societies, WLIC 
DURBAN (Nov. 10, 2007), http://archive.ifla.org/IV /itla73/papers/153-0wen-en.pdf. 
113. /d. 
114. K-12 Schools to Stop Paying for Access Copyright License, ACCESS (Dec. 2012), 
http://myemai l.constantcontact.com/ Access---an-e-newsletter-for -Creator-Affiliates--Decem 
ber-20 12.html ?soid= II 02732265591 &aid=6LjZTBtb5Ms. 
115. /d. 
116. Steve Ladurantaye, Music Played at Public Events to be Subject to New 
Copyright Fees, THEGLOBEANDMAIL (May 31,2012,2:38 PM), http://www.theglobeandma 
il.com/arts/music/music-played-at-public-events-to-be-subject-to-new-copyrightfees/article4 
219846/. 
117. Ariel Katz, Copyright Taxation Without Representation, ARIEL KATZ (June 21, 
20 12), http://arielkatz.org/archives/1882. 
118. Noel Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of the 
Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733, 743 (1998). 
2013] Some Cautionary Tales About Collective Licensing 719 
Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
maintains a rate court to ensure the rates imposed by ASCAP and BMI are 
fair. The consent decree also requires transparency regarding the titles in 
their catalogue. 
Both CROs have been sued multiple times for allegedly monopolistic 
conduct in the aftermath of the consent decrees, but courts have been 
unwilling to restrain them. Noel Hillman, an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the 
Fraud and Public Protection Division of the Department of Justice, recounts 
several instances of ASCAP or BMI abusing their market power and even 
violating the consent decrees under which they both still operate. 119 Despite 
the consent decrees' goal of encouraging fair pricing and choice, the two 
CROs still drive the vast majority of licensees into purchasing expensive 
blanket licenses.120 
In 2009, SoundExchange filed written comments with the United States 
Copyright Royalty Judges seeking to exclude Royalty Logic from becoming 
a competing CRO with SoundExchange. 121 
In 1982, the U.S. Tax Court affirmed the revocation of CCC's tax 
exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service. The court quoted the IRS 
Commissioner's statement that: 
Any public benefits from your activity are subordinate to your primary 
purpose of furthering the economic interest of publishers and copyright 
owners. The fact that your activities support a business purpose serving 
publishers and copyright owners is a strong indication that your activities 
are not charitable as required by the Code and regulations. 122 
The court further stated that: 
We are not faced here with a truly joint undertaking of all parties-
publishers, copyright owners, users, and governmental agency-concerned 
with proper enforcement of the copyright laws, in which efforts are 
focused on meeting the needs and objectives of all involved. Instead, 
petitioner was organized by a segment of a publishers' trade group, the 
Technical, Scientific, and Medical division of the AAP, and there is little 
persuasive evidence that petitioner's founders had interests of any 
119. /d. at 756-62 ("These examples demonstrate that ASCAP and BMI have 
continued to attempt to derive income from non-music programming, have failed to provide 
meaningful per-program licenses, and have sought to require royalties from entities engaged 
in non- compensable public performances. Each of these activities is a substantive violation 
of the consent decrees"). 
120. /d. at 742. 
121. David A. Handzo et al., SoundExchange, Inc., Written Direct Statement of 
SoundExchange, Inc. Before the Coypright Royalty Board In the Matter of Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings (Sept. 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2009-1/statements/wds-sx.pdf. 
122. Copyright Clearance Ctr. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 79 T.C. 793, 803 (T.C. 
1982). 
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substance beyond the creation of a device to protect their copyright 
ownership and collect license fees. 123 
In 2012, Sirius XM filed an antitrust suit against SoundExchange, the 
U.S. digital performance rights CRO, claiming that SoundExchange is 
preventing its independent label members from negotiating directly with 
Sirius for performance licenses. 124 
Professor Ivan Reidel argues that U.S. consumers are subjected to 
excessive advertising on broadcast media due to high CRO blanket license 
fees. 125 A licensing market that was not subject to monopoly pricing would 
lower costs for broadcasters, freeing them to air more of the entertainment 
content that viewers desire. Under the current system, Reidel argues, 
"Audiences and broadcasters ... are necessarily worse off: Audiences are 
served more annoying ads than a competitive market would provide and 
broadcasters pay artificially inflated prices for songs."126 
3. Brazil 
In 2013, Brazil's performance rights CRO ECAD, made up of six 
Brazilian licensing organizations, was convicted of being an illegal cartel 
engaged in price fixing. 127 Brazilian prosecutors showed that leaders of the 
six ECAD member groups met to set rates and colluded to prevent new 
entrants into the market for licenses. The group has been fined $38 million, 
which it cannot pay from artist revenue, and ordered to restructure its 
business in compliance with competition laws. 
Additionally, ECAD demands monthly license fees from bloggers that 
embed YouTube videos on their sites, even though YouTube Brasil already 
pays license fees for those videos. One artist joked, "At my place even the 
cock is forbidden to crow. I don't want problems with ECAD." 128 
123. /d. at 805. 
124. Ed Christman, Sirius XM Files Lawsuit Against SoundExchange and A2/M, 
Alleging Licensing Interference, BILLBOARD (Mar. 28, 2012, 9:28AM), http://www.billboard 
.bizlbbbizlindustrynegal-and-management/siriusxm-files-lawsuit-against-soundexchange-1 0 
06591952.story. 
125. See Reidel, supra note 84. 
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127. Mike Masnick, Brazil's Music Collection Societies Convicted of Price Fixing, 
TECH DIRT (Mar. 22, 2013, 2:24PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20 130322/103441224 
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128. Ricardo Gerome!, Scandal! In Brazil, Blogs with Embedded Youtube Videos are 
Charged Monthly Fees, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rica 
rdogeromel/20 12/03/09/scandal-in-brazi 1-blogs-with-embedded-youtube-videos-are-charged-
monthly-fees/. 
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4. Europe 
In 1993, MTV Europe sued the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and the major record labels for price fixing 
and abuse of a dominant market position. 129 The U.S. Department of Justice 
also investigated the issue, and accused IFPI and major record labels of 
withholding information. 130 After six years of litigation, MTV suddenly and 
mysteriously withdrew its complaint, citing a confidential settlement 
reached with IFPI and the other parties. 131 The dispute had threatened the 
legitimacy of all European collecting societies and created significant 
tensions within the European Commission. 132 
5. Germany 
The German government in the early 1960s investigated GEMA, the 
German CRO, for allegations of price-fixing with other organizations 
including IFPI and Bureau International de L'Edition Mecanique (BIEM). 133 
6. Spain 
SGAE, a Spanish CRO, was fined 1.8 million Euros for abusing its 
monopoly position in the Spanish market. The specific concerns raised were 
"discriminatory and non-transparent application of discounts" and a "so-
called replacement fee, which is unfair and discriminatory." 134 
7. United Kingdom 
Upstart Welsh CRO Eos was formed when Welsh musicians complained 
that UK CRO PRS was shortchanging artists. The new CRO took control of 
over 30,000 Welsh songs on January 1, 2013, and demanded that Welsh 
language radio station Radio Cymru pay 10 times the license fee to 
broadcast songs in Eos' catalog. When no agreement was reached before 
January 1, Radio Cymru shortened its broadcast day by two hours and 
129. Roger Pearson, M1V Europe vs. Majors Goes To Trial, BILLBOARD, Dec. 3, 
1994, at 107. 
130. Bill Holland, Majors Holding Up Inquiry, Gov't Says, BILLBOARD, Nov. 26, 
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BILLBOARD, May 16, 1998, at l. 
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replaced its normal Welsh pop and rock fare with classical music and 
hymns. 135 
8. Australia 
Copyright Agency Limited, the Australian reprographic CRO, collects 
millions of dollars in license fees from schools for their use of freely 
available Internet content. Most of these fees are then distributed to foreign 
website operators who do not expect payment. 136 Australian law also 
requires schools pay compulsory license fees for in-class handouts, a 
practice that would be allowed for free under US fair use law. Australia is 
currently considering revisions to its copyright law, and schools and 
universities have urged a move away from statutory licenses toward fair use 
or fair dealing as a way to "future proof' the law and to allow more efficient 
use of technology in teaching. 137 
B. Aggressive Actions 
Many of the users harmed by CROs expect to pay some sort of license 
for their use; they are commercial actors or are otherwise making uses 
where it seems reasonable to seek a license. These users, described in the 
previous section, are primarily harmed by the monopolistic behaviors of 
CROs seeking additional rents by raising prices.138 But another way that 
CROs can be harmful to users is by trying to expand their customer base by 
aggressively demanding payment from users who reasonably believe their 
activities do not require payment or by demanding exorbitant payments 
from small entities who can't possibly afford to pay. This aggressive pursuit 
of revenue imposes a tax on legitimate social practices, intrudes offensively 
into private, non-commercial activities, and penalizes small, innovative 
cultural practices in favor of large, corporate ones. 
1. United States 
Not content with receiving royalties for performances, ASCAP sought to 
collect license fees for digital downloads from Yahoo! and Rea1Networks. 139 
135. Welsh Music Dispute: BBC Radio Cymru Cuts Airtime and Amends Playlists, 
BBC NEWS (Jan. I, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uklnews/uk-wales-20878895. 
136. Kim Arlington, Schools Pay Millions for Material Free on Net, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (July 23, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/sch 
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Expand Fair Dealing, ARIEL KATZ (Dec. I 0, 2012), http://arielkatz.org/archives/2150. 
138. The Australian tax on educational use described above seems aggressive but is a 
well-established, if wrongheaded, aspect of the current law, rather than an aggressive move 
to enforce commercial rights against previously untaxed uses or users. 
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The Second Circuit rejected AS CAP's argument that digital downloads 
implicated the public performance right. 
ASCAP also sought to collect fees for "public performance" of 
ringtones. (The user already pays for the reproduction right for copying the 
ringtone in his phone.) The court ruled that the playing of a ringtone in 
public does not implicate the public performance right. 140 
In 1995, ASCAP demanded that each of the 2,300 camps represented by 
the American Camping Association (including the Girl Scout camps), 
obtain a blanket license for the public singing of songs. Many of the camps 
paid the $250 per camp fee. In 1996, ASCAP sent a letter to 6,000 other 
camps in the United States, demanding a fee of up to $1,439 per camp. 
Many Girl Scout camps refused to pay the fee, but instructed the counselors 
to refrain from the singing of songs not owned by the Girl Scouts. This led 
to a public relations nightmare for ASCAP, which caused it to retreat. 141 
2. Canada 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada issued five landmark fair dealing 
decisions, including a broad interpretation of "private study" that made clear 
the provision's application to a wide variety of uses related to teaching and 
learning. The decision came just as Access Copyright sought an 
extraordinary increase in licensing fees from Canadian colleges. 142 In the 
wake of the Supreme Court's decision, several universities and all K-12 
institutions in Canada ended their practice of purchasing blanket licenses 
from Access Copyright and announced their intention to rely on fair dealing 
instead. 
Access Copyright has responded with a series of aggressive actions that 
one expert described as "a declaration of war against fair dealing." 143 The 
CRO sued York University over its fair dealing guidelines, which are 
grounded in Canadian Supreme Court precedent, stating that the guidelines 
are "arbitrary and unsupported" and "authorize and encourage copying that 
is not supported by the law."144 Access Copyright also sought a tariff that 
would force K-12 schools to purchase its license rather than rely on fair 
140. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 663 F. Supp. 
2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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asks-royalties-from-girl-scouts-and-regrets-it.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
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dealing, as well as a new tariff for post-secondary education that purports to 
cover uses widely regarded as fair dealing. 145 
3. Slovakia 
The Slovak Performing and Mechanical Rights Society (SOZA) has 
sought money from villages when their children sing. One case involved 
children singing to their mothers on Mothers' Day. Another involved 
singing public domain folk songs about the village. 146 
In 2012, SOZA urged high school students to register with the CRO and 
pay € 15 for a license to perform music at their graduation parties. After 
public protests, the Ministry of Culture appealed to SOZA to stop 
requesting fees on the ground that these parties were not public events. 
SOZA agreed to stop requesting the fees "due to the special social 
character" of the parties, but insisted that it was still legally entitled to the 
fees. 147 
4. Belgium 
SABAM, a Belgian CRO, sought expanded protection for readings of 
copyrighted works. One consequence of their action was that it would 
require librarians to pay a license to read books to children in a children's 
library. Since libraries do not accept payment for these readings, they were 
not able to budget for licensing, and the result was that SABAM put a stop 
to the nefarious practice of reading to children. 148 
SABAM also sought a licensing fee from truck drivers who listened to 
the radio alone in their trucks. 149 
Finally, SABAM has sought a public broadcast license from three 
Belgian Internet service providers on the theory that their failure to 
145. Howard Knopf, Access Copyright Thrashes Thrice, EXCESS COPYRIGHT (Apr. 8, 
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eliminate piracy amounts to consent to widespread dissemination of covered 
works. 150 
5. United Kingdom 
British CRO Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) sought a fee 
from a hardware store owner who listened to the radio in his store while 
cleaning it after he had closed. When the hardware store owner hired 
lawyers to challenge the charge, PPL initially offered to reduce the fee. A 
few days later, with public pressure from a newspaper story, PPL withdrew 
the charge. 151 
UK CRO PRS has sought performance licensing fees from a host of 
unexpected places, including: a woman who played classical music to her 
horses; 152 mechanics who listened to the radio while working (if the volume 
was high enough that it could be heard through the walls in the waiting 
room); 153 police officers who listened to the radio in their offices, gyms, and 
waiting rooms, as well as using music in PowerPoint presentations; 154 and 
small, home-based businesses if customers could hear the music over the 
phone. 155 
6. Germany 
GEMA, a German CRO, generally insists that it must be consulted and 
paid for virtually every use of music, with the burden on the user to prove 
that a license is not required. This insistence is based on a legal ruling that 
states: "Because of the large and comprehensive repertoire GEMA 
manages, at performances of national and international dance and 
150. Ernesto, Music Rights Group Sues ISPs Over "Pirate Tax," TORRENTFREAK 
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licence.html. 
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entertainment music there is an actual assumption militating in favour of the 
existence of a liability fee." 156 
In pursuing these fees, GEMA has refused to recognize the validity of 
licenses issued by a competing CRO. Startup company Jamendo offers 
artists a platform to distribute music freely to the public for non-commercial 
uses under a Creative Commons license (or similar sharing-friendly 
licenses). Jamendo also acts as a CRO for the artist, facilitating commercial 
uses and issuing license certificates to commercial licensees. However, 
GEMA will not accept a certificate issued by Jamendo as proof that a fee is 
not required. 157 
After a free music festival in November 2011, GEMA demanded 
royalties for performances of music for which it controlled no rights. The 
organizer of the festival had asked all disk jockeys to only play music under 
Creative Commons or other free licenses, and had announced the concept to 
GEMA. GEMA demanded the list of all artists whose music would be 
performed, including their full names, place of residence, and date of birth. 
The organizer provided the information to GEMA. Nonetheless, GEMA 
presented him with a bill, claiming that it wasn't certain that everyone on 
the list wasn't a GEMA artist because some of the artists had pseudonyms. 
As noted above, in Germany, the burden of proof that a rights holder is not 
represented by a CRO falls on the user, not the CRO. Relatedly, GEMA is 
now being sued for attempting to collect personal information concerning 
non-GEMA members. 158 
In 2011, GEMA tried to claim a fee from a nonprofit organization for 
releasing a compilation CD featuring the winners of its Creative Commons 
competition "Free! Music! Contest." After receiving an invoice from 
GEMA, the contest organizers filed a complaint for fraud. 159 
In one of its efforts to charge school children for singing, GEMA 
seemingly attempted to claim licensing fees for the performance of the 
Turkish National Anthem. When the school reached out to the Turkish 
government for help in its assertion that the song was not in GEMA's 
catalog, the government decided to pursue copyrighting this work that had 
intentionally been left in the public domain. 160 
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GEMA also triggered controversy in Germany when it sent a reminder to 
preschools that they must pay a license fee for using sheet music in music 
class. 161 
GEMA announced in 2012 its plan to "simplify" its fee structure to 
charge solely based on size of venue, price of admissions, and length of 
events. 162 Some estimate this could result in a 500% to I 000% fee increase 
for some of Berlin's legendary dance clubs, which operate for very 
extended hours (IOpm to 5am is common) compared to traditional bars and 
clubs. Club owners complained that not only would the fees be punitive, but 
the proceeds would benefit mainstream artists rather than the underground 
DJs whose music is actually played in their clubs. Furthermore, GEMA 
continues to place the onus on club owners to prove that material they 
played wasn't owned by GEMA artists. Club proprietors say they may be 
forced to shut down as of April 2013, when the new fee structure goes into 
place. GEMA has also announced a "laptop surcharge" that would add an 
additional fee for the use of MP3s as opposed to vinyl LPs or CDs to 
facilitate performances. 163 
7. Russia 
In March 2010, Russian CRO RAO sued a World War II veterans' choir 
for performing patriotic Soviet songs at a free concert in Samara without 
signing a licensing agreement. 164 
8. Japan 
The Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers, and Publishers 
(JASRAC) caused an uproar when its Managing Director suggested in an 
interview that including music lyrics in a post to micro-blogging platform 
Twitter would require a license. When users panicked, JASRAC 
backpedaled and said it was merely looking into whether it could work out a 
blanket licensing regime to charge Twitter itself for lyrics posted to the site. 
One observer pointed out, "since Twitter users are not (presumably) 
tweeting lyrics for commercial gain, quoting lyrics in tweets seems to come 
161. Catherine Bolsover, Kindergartens Ordered to Pay Copyright for Songs, 
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under the category of Fair Use. Unfortunately, there is no such category in 
Japan's Copyright Law .... " 165 
CONCLUSION 
At first glance, empowering a CRO to issue blanket licenses on behalf of 
disparate rightsholders can seem like a useful hybrid of free markets and 
regulation. As the anecdotes above demonstrate, however, a CRO is just as 
likely to combine the worst excesses of both approaches: all the profit 
maximization of a private business with none of the market discipline of 
competition, all the power of a government agency with none of the 
political accountability. Experts who advocate the use of collective 
licensing often condition their recommendation on the presence of 
appropriate cultural or regulatory conditions that would restrain CRO 
excesses. 166 The stories collected here suggest that these conditions seldom, 
if ever, obtain, even in countries with a history of collective licensing. 
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